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ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH'S DAMAGES CAP IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND AS 
APPLIED TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act is codified at Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 et seq. 
(the "Act"). The damage cap provisions of the Act are unconstitutional on their face, and as 
applied in this case, inasmuch as they are not even rationally related to a legitimate legislative 
goal.1 The alleged legislative goal underlying the damage cap provisions is the preservation 
of governmental coffers. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that this alleged goal is 
weak at best. See Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 1996). Bott held that the Act's 
damage cap limitations were unconstitutional under the facts of that case. Id. The rationale 
of Bott should be extended to the present case for the reasons set forth in Mr. Hart's previous 
brief. 
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act shows that the more compelling 
legislative goal of the Act (to dispense justice to persons injured by governmental 
negligence), is not accomplished by applying the damage limitation in the present case: "I 
think we've waited long enough in this state to enact [the Act]. If it costs a few more bucks 
that we might have justice, I am one that is willing to afford it." Floor Debate, Statement of 
Representative Richard V. Evans, 65th Utah Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1965) (House 
A full analysis of the of the unconstitutionality of the damage cap provisions is found in Mr. Hart's previously 
submitted brief, pp. 35-46. 
1 
recording No. 3, side 1). 
The Actfs damage cap does not further a legitimate legislative goal and it frustrates 
the more compelling legislative goal of dispensing justice to Mr. Hart in this case. 
II. EVEN IF UTAH'S DAMAGES CAP WERE HELD TO BE 
CONSTITUTIONAL, IT CANNOT BE ASSERTED BY SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BECAUSE THE DAMAGES CAP IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE UNDER 
UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HAS WAIVED THAT DEFENSE. 
The Act sets forth numerous waivers of the state's immunity, including exceptions 
thereof, and provides for procedures to govern the institution of any claims or proceedings 
by private persons when immunity is waived. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-4-20. The Act 
also sets forth provisions governing the assessment and payment of damages awarded against 
governmental entities when immunity has been waived, and provides statutory procedures 
for applying liability insurance. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-22-33. The Act also limits 
the amount of damages that can be awarded in cases where immunity has been waived and 
where a state governmental entity has been found liable. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34 (the 
"Damages Cap"). 
The Utah Damages Cap is applicable in cases arising under the Act and prosecuted 
pursuant to the procedural provisions thereof. The Damages Cap is nothing more than an 
exception to the waiver of immunity by a governmental entity when judgment has been 
awarded against it for personal injuries, just as the provisions of Utah Code §63-30-10 are 
2 
an exception to waiver of immunity for injuries arising out of defective highways and roads. 
The only difference is that §63-30-34 excepts from the waiver of immunity only that portion 
of liability over and above $250,000, while §63-30-10 excepts the waiver of immunity 
entirely if any of the enumerated exceptions in that section apply. Consequently, the 
Damages Cap must be seen as a governmental immunity defense arising out of the Act. 
Since "[i]mmunity is an affirmative defense which must be plead and proved by the 
defendant," the Damages Cap must be pled and proven, and can be waived. Nelson By and 
Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court, in this case, held that Salt Lake County "voluntarily and knowingly 
waived and abandoned any defenses it may have had based on governmental immunity. . . 
." (R. 1456). As Mr. Hart argued in his earlier brief, the County's waiver of immunity 
precludes it from asserting the discretionary function exception on appeal. Appellee's Brief 
at 13-14. The same logic applies to bar the County from asserting the Damages Cap as an 
affirmative defense, after having voluntarily and knowingly waived it. 
Although the County places much emphasis on its contention that governmental 
immunity is a question invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and therefore 
cannot be waived, the argument must fail. While the argument is attractive on its face, upon 
closer examination it is manifestly flawed. The argument lacks logic and is unsupportable 
in law. In its Reply Brief, Salt Lake County argues that "Utah courts have not 'held' that 
3 
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense for purposes of whether the doctrine implicates 
the subject matter jurisdiction of Utah courts and may, therefore be waived." Appellant's 
Reply at 1. Such linguistic alchemy should not be persuasive with this court when the 
judicial pronouncements cited by Mr. Hart are so clear: "Sovereign immunity, however, is 
an affirmative defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the question of whether there 
is tort liability in the first instance." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 152-153 (Utah 1989). 
Given such clear language in Nelson and Ferree, it is hard to believe that Justice Stewart did 
not intend to say what he said, in writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in both cases. It 
is not clear from the County's argument if it is contending that the Supreme Court has 
carelessly and incorrectly characterized governmental immunity as an affirmative defense, 
or if the Court was merely making that characterization as an incidental aside, intending 
immunity to be asserted as an affirmative defense only in the abstract. Appellant's Reply at 
2, fii. 1. Either way, Mr. Hart believes the language is clear and the doctrine is consistent 
with the approach taken by courts in this and other jurisdictions. In Utah, governmental 
immunity is an affirmative defense for all purposes. 
Salt Lake County's argument that governmental immunity is a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived not only disregards the plain language and intent 
of the cases cited, it also ignores a most compelling fact: the legislature has waived 
governmental immunity in many instances. The County's analysis of the Ferree case is 
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misplaced and arrives at the wrong conclusion. The very fact that Ferree articulated an 
"order of analysis. . . in deciding a case that may involve sovereign immunity", which 
established a preference for deciding duty questions prior to immunity questions strongly 
supports Appellee's position that the defense of governmental immunity does not raise 
questions concerning the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. If it did, then the courts 
would apply that question as a threshold inquiry because, depending upon how it was 
decided, such inquiry may avoid the necessity of determining any other issue. 
The County's interpretation of a line of cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
("FTCA") is equally misplaced. In its original brief, Appellant relies heavily on Williams v. 
United States, 50 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 1995) for the proposition that governmental immunity 
invokes the subject matter of the court and cannot be waived. This argument, however, is 
a smoke screen which once blown away reveals that the procedure followed by federal courts 
is practicably identical to the procedure followed by Utah state courts, except that the 
question of federal subject matter jurisdiction is much more limited and therefore more 
sensitive than is the question of the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts. It is clear that 
federal court analysis of FTCA claims does recognize the doctrines of waiver and proof. 
Williams involved a plaintiff who filed suit against the United States, as lessee of a 
commercial premises upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell. The evidence demonstrated 
that responsibility for maintaining the leased premises, including the floors, was contractually 
5 
imposed upon a private independent contractor. Under the circumstances, the court held that 
"if Meridian is an independent contractor, as the United States asserts, and not an agent or 
employee of the United States, the United States has not waived sovereign immunity." Id. 
at 304. The court also recognized that the "party who sues the United States bears the burden 
of pointing to . . . an unequivocal waiver of that immunity". Id. Obviously, the Williams 
court cannot be cited for the proposition that governmental immunity gives rise to an 
unwaivable subject matter jurisdiction defense. 
Williams is also inconsistent with Salt Lake County's position on another point. The 
decisional process by which federal courts resolve the question of discretionary immunity in 
FTCA cases is functionally identical to the process followed by state courts. First, the 
evidence is examined to determine if a factual basis exists for establishing a limited waiver 
of immunity in circumstances where the acts or omissions of agents or employees of the 
United States give rise to injury. If the alleged act or omission is committed by an agent or 
employee of the United States, the next inquiry is whether the discretionary function 
exception applies to limit that waiver of sovereign immunity. If so, the courts find that the 
jurisdictional grant is not available, that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, and refuse to 
hear the case. Id. at 304-305. As can be seen, the question of waiver is addressed by federal 
courts before immunity is considered as a jurisdictional question and it is only if no waiver 
can be found that the courts invoke the jurisdictional bar. 
6 
It is obvious that Salt Lake County is confused in its understanding of the nature of 
subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts as compared to subject matter jurisdiction 
questions in state courts. Federal courts are established by the United States Constitution as 
courts of limited jurisdiction, whose jurisdictional reach is limited to cases involving federal 
questions or disputes between litigants of diverse citizenship, where the amount in 
controversy exceeds the minimum requirement. 28 U.S.C.§§1331, 1332. State courts, by 
contrast, are courts of general jurisdiction. When a claim arises under the FTC A, it is almost 
always a case involving common law (state law) tort claims which would not normally 
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, except for the fact that limited rights of action 
against the United States have been created by federal legislation. Therefore, if the requisite 
elements for proceeding under the FTCA fail, the claim loses its mantle of federal law and 
reverts to a state law tort claim which cannot satisfy federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If not for the limited nature 
of federal subject matter jurisdiction, however, the order of analysis would be identical to 
that followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Ferree, where the question of governmental 
immunity as an affirmative and waivable defense is considered prior to the question of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
The question is whether Salt Lake County waived its governmental immunity 
defenses. As noted above, the trial court sitting in the best position to review the evidence 
7 
and the intent of counsel for Salt Lake County, found that the County had made a voluntary 
and knowing waiver and abandonment of all its immunity defenses. This Court should defer 
to the trial court on questions of fact. The County's waiver, by definition, includes a waiver 
of the immunity set forth in the Damages Cap. Having waived all governmental immunities, 
the County cannot find protection or relief in a defense arising out of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
III. BECAUSE SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS WAIVED ITS GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY, IT CANNOT CLAIM THE DEFENSE OF DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION IMMUNITY UNDER A RULE 60(b)(7) ANALYSIS ON APPEAL. 
As the foregoing argument establishes, Salt Lake County waived any governmental 
immunity defense it may have otherwise had and, therefore, cannot argue an immunity 
defense on appeal. Not only did the County make a specific and oral waiver in open court 
of its immunity defenses, it also waived those defenses by failing to present any evidence or 
argument to establish a discretionary function exception during pretrial and trial proceedings. 
As noted above, immunity must be pled and proved by the defendant. Salt Lake County 
presented no evidence at trial to prove the existence of facts which would support a 
discretionary function exception. This failure both demonstrates Salt Lake County's 
understanding that it had waived governmental immunity defenses, and its continuing 
concurrence that the facts did not support a discretionary function exception. 
The County's attempt to raise the defense of governmental immunity after waiving 
8 
the same in pre-trial proceedings has been squarely rejected by the courts of this state. In 
Rumsey v. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 310, 400 P.2d 205 (Utah 1965), the plaintiff sued Salt 
Lake City for personal injuries which occurred at a pool operated by the defendant. The 
parties entered into a pre-trial order which disposed of the immunity issue and left only the 
issues of negligence and damages for trial. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and Salt Lake City filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
contending that plaintiff had not introduced evidence sufficient to establish that Salt Lake 
City's operation of the pool was undertaken in a proprietary capacity rather than a 
governmental capacity, which would work a waiver of immunity. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the question of the defendant's immunity had been already been resolved 
before the trial began: 
In the pre-trial order it appears that the parties agreed that at the time of the 
accident, [plaintiff] was a business invitee. Such a fact could only be material 
in the event the [pool] was being operated in a proprietary capacity. If the 
[pool] were operated in a governmental capacity the City would be immune 
from liability regardless of the status of the respondent. It would appear 
therefore that the issue of whether the [pool] was operated in a governmental 
or proprietary capacity was a matter which was disposed of in the pre-trial 
conference and the issues for trial were therefore . . . limited to the remaining 
issues of negligence an damages, unless modified at the trial to prevent 
manifest injustice. 
M at 207. The significance of Rumsey is its recognition that a governmental entity is capable 
of effectively waiving immunity defenses during litigation, and its enforcement of such a 
waiver. 
9 
The County now argues that it should be permitted to raise and prove discretionary 
function immunity for the first time in post trial and appeal proceedings having utterly failed 
to introduce evidence of discretionary function immunity at trial. This argument is premised 
on two faulty arguments: (1) that it preserved the immunity defense, and (2) that it is entitled 
to raise and prove the defense post trial because of a change of law announced in Keegan v. 
State of Utah 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995), which was published after the trial ended. The 
problems with the first argument are set forth above. The fatal flaws in the second argument 
are generally set forth in Appellee's original brief at pages 21-27, infra at page 23 fh.5. 
However, based upon the County's argument in its Reply Brief, it must be 
emphatically reiterated here that our Supreme Court has clearly reaffirmed prior case law in 
holding that the waiver of immunity contained in Utah Code § 63-30-8 is subject to the 
discretionary exception in Sec. 63-30-10. Contrary to Salt Lake County's argument that 
"[t]he Duncan opinion does not address whether section 10 applied to retain immunity under 
section 8" (Appellant's Reply at 6), the Duncan opinion actually "reaffirmed [the court's] 
holding in Velasquez" and declared that its decisions in cases decided between Velasquez and 
Duncan had "not eroded [its] holding in Velasquez." Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 842 
P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992). Since Duncan was decided before Salt Lake County litigated and 
tried this case, the law was clear at all times pertinent to this case that the discretionary 
function exception was applicable to a section 8 waiver. 
10 
Keegan affirms this position. In referencing its earlier decisions, the Keegan court 
disabused its readers of any notion that it represented a change in the law. "This court's 
decisions subsequent to Velasquez have continued to apply section 63-30-10 analysis in cases 
brought under other sections of the Act." Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d at 621. The first 
decision cited in support of that statement was Duncan, which clearly indicated that the 
Supreme Court deemed Duncan to have dispelled any notion that Velasquez was not still 
good law and had not always been good law. 
Salt Lake County simply does not have a sound basis to argue that the law was 
different at the time this case was tried than it was following the Keegan decision. The 
County cannot avoid its responsibility to be familiar with the law under these circumstances. 
At a minimum, if the County recognized some lack of clarity in the law and believed that it 
could prove a discretionary function exception, it should have presented evidence in support 
of such a finding and then argued its position on appeal. However, the County chose instead 
to waive and abandon any such defense, and to completely fail in proffering or introducing 
any evidence in support of the exception. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding 
that Salt Lake County waived its immunity defenses must be affirmed. 
IV. THE COUNTY EXPRESSLY WAIVED AND ABANDONED ITS 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DEFENSE. 
In the face of its own indisputable admission that "immunity" was waived and 
abandoned (R. 507-09), the County argues that its counsel's statements in direct response to 
11 
the Court's question regarding the County's intent to abandon an immunity defense should 
be ignored. In support, the County initially argued the statement was equivocal, citing only 
a portion of the parties' joint dialogue with the Court. Because Mr. Hart brought the mis-
citation of the record to the County's attention, the County now urges this Court to simply 
disregard the clarifying and dispositive statements of Mr. Hart's counsel, Kelly Nash. The 
County advances a self-serving and legally unsupported argument that "[a] finding of waiver 
cannot be based on statements made by opposing counsel." (County's Reply at 4). The 
County's argument is illogical and ignores the context and purpose of counsel's dialogue 
with the Court. 
During oral argument on the County's summary judgment motion and based upon the 
pre-hearing discussions of counsel and the County's oral argument (which, as discussed by 
counsel, excluded any reference to immunity defense), Mr. Nash specifically advised the trial 
court that the "issues with reference to the immunity defense are not being pursued" by the 
County and that "there's an express waiver of immunity in this case" by the County. (R 507). 
In response to this representation, the trial court asked if the County was abandoning the 
immunity defense argued in the briefs. Mr. McKnight candidly responded in the affirmative. 
It is significant that Mr. McKnight made no attempt to correct Mr. Nash's characterization 
of the waiver. (R. 507-509). Based upon this dialogue, the trial court understood and later 
ruled that the County "voluntarily and knowingly waived and abandoned' the immunity 
12 
defense. (R. 1456.) The trial court subsequently stated that "[i]t seems unequivocal to [the 
Court] that he was relinquishing, knowingly relinquishing any right he may have had to raise 
that issue.. . ." (R. 2376). 
Selectively citing the record, the County now argues that because Mr. Nash's words 
summarizing the County's waiver of the defense were not actually spoken by the lips of the 
County's counsel, no waiver should be found to have occurred. Despite the County's 
position, the legal criteria for a waiver does not and should not impose the standard urged by 
the County.2 
The trial court's Findings and Conclusions regarding the County's waiver and 
abandonment of immunity should be upheld, particularly where the standard of review of 
such factual matters is the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
The County is suggesting, that the absence of a contemporaneous ruling on the waiver 
issue precludes a finding of waiver on appeal, is likewise unpersuasive. In addition to being 
unsupported by any case law, this argument ignores the context of the waiver and the 
practicalities of pretrial practice. As a result of the County's voluntary abandonment of the 
immunity defense, the trial court disregarded the immunity arguments and granted, albeit 
erroneously, summary judgment on the sole basis of causation. This decision was reversed 
Even assuming Mr. McKnight's words, standing alone, did not satisfy the legal threshold for a waiver, the 
relevant and dispositive statements of Mr. Nash together with the trial court's direct inquiry, absolutely clarified and 
established Mr. McKnight's intention to effectuate a waiver in this instance. 
13 
on appeal. Given the County's abandonment of the defense, the motion was decided on the 
remaining legal issue, namely, causation. (R. 488-89). There was no reason at the time for 
the trial court to reference the County's waiver of immunity as it did not pertain to the 
causation-based summary judgment. (R. 469). A written court order is not required to give 
effect to the admissions, stipulations and agreements of a party in open court and is not a 
condition to legality of such. As in this case, the record is sufficient documentation of such 
admissions and establishes the law of the case. The trial court's conduct was appropriate in 
all respects under the circumstances. 
V. THE COUNTY ALTOGETHER FAILED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF AN IMMUNITY DEFENSE. 
The County has clearly acknowledged its failure to introduce evidence at trial 
regarding the immunity defense. (See Hart Brief at 15, n.7). In fact, the post-trial affidavit 
of Tosh Kano is recognized as the sole direct evidence of "the discretionary nature of the act 
or omission in widening Wasatch Boulevard." (Applt. Brief at 39). Ironically, despite having 
listed Mr. Kano in preparation for trial, the County failed to call him as a witness. Based 
upon the absence of evidence in the record respecting, and the in-court waiver of, the 
immunity defense, the Court properly struck the untimely and inadmissable Kano affidavit. 
(R. 1452-59).3 
3See Bekins Bar VRanch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642 P .2d 371, 372 (Utah 1982) ("Once both parties have 
rested and the court has ruled on the sufficiency of Plaintiff s case it is simply too late to inject a new issue into the 
case."); Tangaro v. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390, 391 (Utah 1962) (court properly declined tp reopen case where Plaintiff had 
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The County argues that Mr. Hart's counsel did not contest the post-trial submission 
of the Kano affidavit, hoping that, as a result, the affidavit might after-the-fact be deemed 
a part of the trial record as a matter of law. The County's arguments are factually and legally 
unsupported. First, the trial record cannot be supplemented after the trial is concluded and 
the verdict has been rendered. Indeed, the evidence sought to be introduced by the County 
post-trial neither has been, nor can be, subjected to cross-examination and cannot be 
considered by the jury in the context of all facts presented. Second, the attempted post-trial 
submission of evidence was specifically evaluated and stricken by the trial court as, inter 
alia, untimely and inadmissable. Moreover, even if Mr. Hart had failed to object to the Kano 
affidavit, the trial court was empowered to preclude the introduction of inadmissible 
evidence sua sponte. As to the question of Mr. Hart's objection thereto, the record actually 
reflects that he timely objected, contrary to the County's characterization. (R. 1528-30,1533) 
Finally, the County contends that simply because it believes the post-trial Kano 
affidavit contained information relevant to the discretionary function analysis, the affidavit 
must therefore be admissible. As discussed supra this belief is unfounded and ignores the 
rules of evidence. (See also Appellee's Brief at 16-17). The County's arguments should be 
disregarded on appeal. 
every opportunity to present evidence during trial); Tang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 217 (Alaska 1991) (court did not abuse 
discretion in excluding affidavit where party waited until after close of evidence to seek admission thereof). 
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VI. EVEN IF § 63-30-34 (1) IS DEEMED CONSTITUTIONAL IN THIS CASE, 
THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT SHOULD ALLOW COSTS, 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST BEYOND 
THE STATUTORY LIMITATION FOR PERSONAL DAMAGE INJURY. 
A. UTAH LAW CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR COSTS AND INTEREST 
BEYOND THE $250,000 PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE 
LIMITATION. 
If constitutional, and if not waived in its entirety, a determination of whether the Act 
limits costs and interest involves an exercise in statutory interpretation. "The primary rule 
of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the 
purposes the statute was meant to achieve.'1 De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 
743, 746 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). And the "best evidence of the legislature's intent 
is the plain meaning of the statute." Cache County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 922 P.2d 
758, 767 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Therefore, to properly interpret the Act this Court 
will first look to the language of the statutes comprising the Act and construe them according 
to their plain meaning. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996). 
The Act expressly contemplates the payment of costs and interest beyond the personal 
injury damage limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1) (a). This is evident from 
the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-34 (1) (a) and 63-30-4(1) (b), as well as the 
definitions of injury and personal injury found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2. Construing 
these sections together (it is the court's "duty to construe a statutory provision so as to make 
it harmonious with other statutes relevant to the subject matter" Stahl v. Utah Transit 
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Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980)), it is clear that the Act only limits monetary 
damages for personal injury, not costs and interests. 
First, § 63-30-34(1) (a), on its face, only limits the amount of money damages 
awarded for bodily injury and nothing else. This limitation is very clear, discrete and 
unambiguous. It simply limits damages for "personal injury" in a judgment. The terms 
"injury" and "personal injury" are defined in the Act as follows: 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or 
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (5) and (6). There is no language in these definitions that could 
possibly support the conclusion that costs or interest are included in a judgment for personal 
injury damages. When construed with the rest of the Act, it is evident that the Act intended 
to limit a judgment for death or injury to a person and not the costs or interest associated with 
that judgment.4 
In this respect, Utah is similar to other states which have held that limitations on 
Additionally, as set forth in Appellee's previous brief, this conclusion is supported by Utah's prejudgment 
interest statute which recognizes that interest on a judgment is clearly distinct from "damage for personal injury." See 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44(2) (b) (it is the duty of the court "in entering judgment... to add [prejudgment interest] to 
the amount of special damages actually incurred . . ." (emphasis added)). The law also recognizes that post-judgment 
interest has nothing to do with damages for personal injury. Curtin v. Department of State Highways, 339 N.W.2d 7,10 
(Mich. App. 1983). The same analysis applies to costs. Costs are "reimbursement of the expense of litigating the claim" 
and have nothing to do with damages for personal injury. Lienhardv. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Minn. 1988). 
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judgments against governmental entities do not limit an award of costs and interests. Woods 
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. or Transportation, 612 A.2d 970, 971 (Pa. 1992) 
(prejudgment interest in a personal injury case against the state cannot be limited by a 
$250,000 damages cap in Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity act); Wilmer v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 916 F. Supp. 1079,1081 (D. Kan. 1996) (post-judgment interest and 
costs awarded against county in excess of statutory limit where statute expressly limits 
prejudgment, but not post-judgment interest or costs); Montgomery Hosp. v. Medical 
Catastrophe Loss Fund, 668 A.2d 221, 223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (state is liable for post-
judgment interest even though payment of such interest would require state to pay in excess 
of statutory limit); Texas Department of Transportation v. Ramming, 861 S.W.2d 460, 469 
(Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1993) (post-judgment interest is not limited by the Texas 
Tort Claims Act limit on damages, "[p]ost-judgment interest, by encouraging prompt 
payment of judgments, is an effective enforcement mechanism11); Austin v. State of 
Tennessee, 831 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Term. App. 1991) (cap placed on the recovery of damages 
"is clearly for the damages awarded and does not apply to the award of interest"); Elmore 
County Common v. Ragona, 561 So.2d 1092, 1095 (Ala. 1990) (state is liable for post-
judgment interest to the same extent as any private judgment debtor and such interest is not 
subject to statutory damage cap); Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn. 1988) 
(costs and post-judgment interest are not part of a claim for injury and are not limited by 
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Minnesota's limitation on tort claims). 
Second, § 63-30-4(l)(b) states that where immunity is waived, a governmental entity's 
liability "shall be determined as if the entity were a private person." Because a private person 
sued for damages arising from personal injury is liable for costs, prejudgment interest and 
post judgment interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-44 and Utah Code Ann. §15-1-
4, a governmental entity is also liable for prejudgment and post judgment interest under the 
Act. 
Interpreting these statutes according to their plain meaning, and reading the statutory 
wording literally, assuming the legislature used each term advisedly {see Carlie, 922 P.2d at 
4) it is readily apparent that the Utah legislature did not intend to limit an award of costs and 
interest in the Act. 
B. SALT LAKE COUNTY'S CLAIM THAT UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT LIMITS COSTS AND INTEREST IS ENTIRELY 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
1. Allowing Costs and Interests Beyond the Limitation on Damages 
for Personal Injury Does Not Ignore the Objectives of Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
In its Reply Brief, Salt Lake County claims that Mr. Hart's "argument ignores the 
objectives of the Governmental Immunity Act which is to place an outer limit on the legal 
liability of a governmental entity in order to enable government to provide fiscal certainty 
to governmental operations." (Reply Brief, 20). However, Salt Lake County's argument 
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completely ignores the express statutory language of the Act itself and then emphasizes only 
one of the objectives of the Act. By so doing Salt Lake County fails to interpret and 
harmonize the provisions of the Act as a whole. See De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
913 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 1996) (any uncertainty about the meaning or application of an act 
should resolved by analyzing the act in its entirety and harmonizing the actfs provisions with 
its intent and purpose). 
Mr. Hart's argument, on the other hand, acknowledges the language of the Act itself 
as well as all of the objectives of the Act. There is no question that one of the objectives of 
the Act is to limit a governmental entity's liability for monetary damages; however, an 
equally important, if not more important, objective is to hold governmental entities 
accountable in the same manner as private parties and to provide redress to persons who are 
injured by governmental negligence. Mr. Hart's interpretation of the Act, according to the 
plain meaning of the statute, supports all of these objectives. The governmental entity's 
monetary liability is expressly limited for personal injury damages, yet the entity is held 
accountable (the same as a private party would be) for delays in settling a matter, bringing 
a matter to trial or extending payment of a judgment indefinitely through layers of appeal. 
Adopting Salt Lake County's argument would open the door for abuse by governmental 
entities who would be able to postpone payment of a judgment debt (since they are not 
subject to liens or garnishment) without fear of incurring any interest penalty. See Ramming, 
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861 S.W. 2d at 469. Similarly, a governmental entity could run up costs on appeal in an 
effort to "beat down" a plaintiff unable to fund appellate litigation (since it is not always 
available on a contingency basis). The only way that requiring a governmental entity to pay 
costs and interest beyond the personal injury damage limitation could even remotely affect 
the "public treasury" would be if the governmental entity unnecessarily or improperly delayed 
resolving a matter or paying a judgment debt. And, if that is the case, the entity is properly 
held liable for its actions. Clearly, in order to fulfill all of the objectives of the Act (which 
are primarily focused on holding governmental agencies accountable in the same manner as 
private parties) the Act must be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the statutes 
constituting the Act, that is, a governmental entity's liability is limited to "damages for 
personal injury" and it is held accountable for costs and interests in the same manner as a 
private party. 
2. Salt Lake County's Cited Authority Supports the Conclusion That 
Utah's Statutory Law Allows for Costs and Interests Beyond the 
Limitation on Damages for Personal Injury. 
Salt Lake County's cited authority in support of its claim (that Mr. Hart's 
interpretation of the Act ignores the objective of preserving the public treasury) actually 
supports Mr. Hart's position. Salt Lake County cites two cases where courts in other states 
have held that a statutory cap precludes the recovery of costs or interest. 
The first case cited is Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986). 
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In Lee, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under Colorado's statutory scheme, "the total 
amount of [a] judgment, inclusive of interest and costs, must not exceed the recovery 
limitations imposed by section 24-10-114 . . . ." Id. at 229 (emphasis added). Colorado's 
statutory limitation, unlike Utah's, expressly limits the maximum amount that may be 
recovered under Colorado's governmental immunity act: 
The maximum amount that may be recovered under this article in any 
single occurrence, whether from one or more public entities and public 
employees, shall be: 
(a) For any injury to one person in any single occurrence, the sum of 
one hundred fifty thousand dollars; . . . . 
Colo. Rev. Stats. §24-10-114 (1) (a) (emphasis added). Colorado limits the "maximum 
amount that may be recovered," a phrase that would clearly encompass all damages, costs 
and interest. Utah, on the other hand, limits only the damages for personal injury. Lee 
simply supports Mr. Hart's position that costs and interest are limited only where they are 
expressly limited by the language of the statute.5 
The same analysis is true of the second case cited by Salt Lake County, Berek v. 
Metropolitan Dade County, 422 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1982). Berekhcld that Florida's statutory 
5
 Where a statutory scheme expressly limits the "total liability of the state" or limits liability or damages 
generally, prejudgment interest is sometimes limited by a damages cap. See Lienhardv. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 863-64 
(Minn. 1988) and Texas Department of Transportation v. Ramming, 861 S.W.2d 460, 468 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th 
Dist] 1993). See also Appellee's Brief at 49 for additional cases limiting recovery based on express statutory language. 
However, Utah's statutory scheme clearly and discretely limits only damages for "personal injury" and using the same 
basic principles of statutory interpretation utilized by these cases, an opposite conclusion must be reached, i.e., Utah's 
legislature did not intend to limit prejudgment interest. 
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limitation prohibited recovery of costs and interests beyond the amount of the limitation. 
However, Florida's statutory limitation expressly excludes "interest for the period prior to 
judgment" and also limits governmental liability for "a claim or a judgment by any one 
person which exceeds the sum of $50,000." Id at 839, citing §768.28(5) Fla. Stats. (1979). 
This language was interpreted by the court as limiting the "maximum amount of the state's 
liability to any one claimant . . . ." Id. at 840. Again, Utah's statute is obviously more 
restrictive in its limitation, limiting only a judgment for personal injury damages rather than 
an entire "claim or a judgment." Therefore, Berek also supports Mr. Hart's position that 
costs and interest are limited only where they are limited by statute. 
3. Basic Rules of Statutory Interpretation Support Allowing Costs 
and Interest Beyond the Limitation on Damages for Personal 
Injury. 
Salt Lake County's Reply Brief summarily argues that Mr, Hart's interpretation of the 
Act is contrary to the rule of statutory construction that "when two provisions address the 
same subject matter and one provision is general while the other is specific, the specific 
provision controls." (Reply Brief, 21). Salt Lake County then concludes (without 
explanation) that Utah's cost and interest statutes are general and the damage cap is specific 
and, therefore, Mr. Hart's interpretation of the statutory damage limitation violates this 
particular rule of statutory interpretation. Mr. Hart does not disagree with the County's 
statement of law, however, it is not applicable to Mr. Hart's interpretation of the Act for 
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several reasons. 
First, the Act and Utah's prejudgment interest statute do not address the same subject 
matter, and both statutes are properly applied to the current matter. Therefore, the 
prerequisites for applying this rule of interpretation are non-existent. 
Second, even if the Act and the prejudgment interest statute did address the same 
subject matter, there is no conflict in applying both the Act and Utah's costs and interest 
statutes. The Act defines personal injury and then limits an entity's liability for personal 
injury damages. The Act also states that where immunity is waived, governmental entities 
are held liable as if the entity were a private person. Utah's costs and interest statute simply 
supports and reinforces the interpretation of the Act by stating that it is the duty of the court 
"in entering judgment. . . to add [prejudgment interest] to the amount of special damages 
actually incurred . . . " Clearly, Utah law, pursuant to both the Act and the prejudgment 
interest statute, does not recognize prejudgment interest as constituting a part of a judgment 
for personal injury damages. 
Finally, the fact that Utah's prejudgment interest statute is not a part of the Act does 
not necessarily mean that it is a "general" rather than a "specific" provision. The Act adopts 
Utah's prejudgment interest statute (thereby making it "specific") by placing governmental 
entities in the same position as private parties. 
Although Salt Lake's argument regarding statutory construction is inapposite in this 
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case, there is an applicable rule of statutory interpretation that supports Mr. Hart's 
interpretation of the Act: A court must interpret statutory law "according to its literal 
wording unless it is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Gleave v. Denver & R. G. W. 
R.R., Co., 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988), cert, den., 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Construed according to their literal wording, both the Act and Utah's prejudgment 
interest statute clearly show that Utah does not limit costs and interests pursuant to the Act's 
limitation for personal injury damages. 
CONCLUSION 
To apply the Damages Cap Statute in this case and thereby diminish the jury's verdict 
in favor of Mr. Hart from $678,300 to $250,000 would violate substantial and fundamental 
rights under the Utah Constitution. 
Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff against Salt Lake County in the 
full amount of the jury's verdict of $678,300, together with pre- and post-judgment interest 
and costs. 
DATED this of March, 1997. 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, P.C. 
3J/A. SCHMUT2 
LANCE N. LONG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Hart 
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